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Ab.~lracl-llIlcrnetworms continue 10 plague the Inler-
lIet infrasll"UciuTc with will~r and deeper impacl since the
Morris Worm in carly 1988. It has been further shoWJl
lhal beller-engineered worms like Warhol WOTms amI Flash
worms cuuld spread across the Internet in minutes or ('YCIl
lens of seconds rather limn huun;. Snch \'irulenl spread-
ing ilwalidflles ~my manual counter-measures find poses an
extreme))" serious threat 10 the safely of the Internet.
To address this challenge, this paper proposes a nowl
worm-curl ailing scheme, i.e., beehive, which is able tojiglll-
hack worm propagation by acth-ely immunizing lilly en-
countered worm-infected node. 1\·lore specificall)', by own-
ing a pori ion of the unused bnt routllble IP space that is
open tu infcclion attempts of different worms, II beehh'e not
only allracts and lraps these allelllpts, but lliso defellsh'ely
~h'es a ~-ecflr;ty .~llOt 10 each attempting worm-infected node.
The security shot will immunize the infected nude so IIlat
the node will not be lIble 10 infect others. Our formal anal-
ysis shows that eyen one beehh'e network with a reasonable
IP address .~J)ace can elTectivcly mitigate i1cth'e spreading
of worms amOIl~ a million nodes. This paper presenls both
anab·sis and simulation results of beehh'e enlluation. Par-
ticularly, our resullsshow lhat for a Cllndom-prohing worm,
II jl 3 beehi\'e network or 8 class n networks fire llble tu re-
duce the maximum wurm infection cm·crage 10 as low a.~
1:1;1(.. To Ihe best of our knowledge, no such worm fight-
back mechanism has been propo.~ed and mmlJ7;ed before.
Finall)', 1I beehive prototype is presented to demomlrale its
praclic,J1it r·
Index Terms-security, wonn, modeling, simulalion, s)'s,
tern design
I, INTRODUCTION
Sillce the Morris Worm of early 1988. Ihe persistenl
e.xistence and desLrUCLive spreading of worms have posed
signific<J1l1 threals to Ihe shared Internet infraslmcture.
Recent worm ineidenls like Code Red worms [I J,lIld MS-
Bl:lsler worms [8] have jusL warned us how fragile our
networks are and how fast a virulent worm Can spre:ld.
Even worse. bellcr-engineered worms like Warhol worms
:md FllI.\·h worms could spread across the InLernel in min-
utes or even tens of' seconds rathcr than hours [ I 5]. Also.
with current computer system.s becoming more and more
complicaLed. iL is more diffieull lhan before to eliminate
soflware bugs. In fac!. new more security vulnerabili-
Lies have been discovered on a daily basis <Ind exploiLing
worms have been observed more frequently Lhan bcfore:
Code Rcd worms [I J and Nimda worms f61 in 200 I. SQL-
Slammer worms [7J in 2002. MSBJaster wonns [81 and
SoBig worms [IOJ in 2003. and MyDoom wonns [111.
Willy Worms [12J. and Sasser worms [131 in 2004. This
serious situation poses great ch:lllenges for the effective
containmenL or rast-spreading worms.
There <Ire few answers. either proactive or reaclive.
to the worm IhreaL. Proaclive approach puts the com-
puter systems 'llways on 'llert for pOLenLi:l1 vulnerabili-
lies and tries Lo seal vulncmbility holes before Lhey are
exploited. For example. the Windows Update Service
checks the availability of security palches and applies
them Lo eliminate sccurity defects [6](7J[81 in a Limely
fashion. However. experience [27J has shown Lhat cnd-
users or even network adminislraLors ol'len do noL inslall
securiLy palches even long after they arc made available
because of the following concerns 129]:
• Service disruption: Applying:l patch typically in-
volves resLarLing affectcd hOsl service or cven resLart-
ing the entire host sysLem. which may nOi be accepl-
able for critiC:l1 services.
• Patch unrcliabilily and irreversibility; Security
patches arc released as <Iuick responsCs for identified
vulnerabilities and may nol have been fully verillcd.
Moreover. installing a security paLch is a commonly
irreversible operation: Ollce a paLch is applied. there
is no easy way to un-inslallthe paLch.
Olher worm conLainmenl schemes are also proposed:
Moore er al. [221 proposed Addre.\'.\· black/islillS and COI1-
rellf filrerillEf to isolale worms: Willi.lmson el af. 1141 sug-
gested modifying the network stack Lo throttle the worm
propagation rate: Chen el {II. [23J described a distributed
anLi-worm architecture (DAW) to slow down worm prop-
agation.
This paper presents a novel amI complementing worm-
repressing scheme called beehil'e. Residing in an un-
used bm routable network which would be. either ran-
domly or preferably. illlacked by different worms, a bee-
hive nm only allracts and traps these auempLs. bUl defen-
sively gives a security SllOl to each infected node that is
auempling 10 infect an IP belonging to the beehive. The
security shot will then inoculate the infected node. As we
will show, a beehive with a reasonably large IP space can
effectively mitigate active spreading of worms among a
million vulnemble nodes. The contributions of lhis paper
are threefold:
• First. a new mechanism is proposed to suppress
worm propagation by aClively fighling back and im-
munizing attempting worm instances. To the best of
our knowledge, no such worm light-b<lck mechanism
has been proposed previously.
• Second. this paper conducts a formal study of bee-
hive and presents associated models based on two
worm models, i.e.. the classic epillemic model and
lhe fll'()-[tlclor worm model [20]. Holh numerical and
simulation results show promise.
• Third. a sigmllure-based beehive prototype has been
buill to demonsLrale its practicalily and effectiveness.
The rest of lhis p:lper is organized as follows: Seclion II
presents background on worms and describes how beehive
can be used to cont:lin worm propagalion. The follow-
ing seclion analyzes beehive using the classic epidemic
wonn model and shows analytical expressions. numeri-
cal solulions, and simulation resulls. Furthermore, bee-
hive is modeled based on a recently proposed lW()-j'lIctor
worm model [201 to demonslrale its generality. In Section
IV. beehive deployment issues arc discussed. Our bee-
hive prototype is presented in Section V. Finally, Section
VI examines relmed work and Section VII concludes this
paper.
II. THE BEEHIVE ApPROACH
This paper focuses on worms replicaling themselves
without human interacLions by remotely exploiting know/l
vulnerabilities in operating systems or application ser-
vices. If we brenk down the actions of these worms [I J
[81 [131. the following common behaviors or stages will
be exposed:
• Tclrgef Selecliol/ This stage picks up :I t<lrget either
randomly r11 or wilh certain locnl subnet preference
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Fig. I. StagciJ Vic\\' or Worm Inrcction
be used to locale a node running a vulnerable service.
The vulnerability can be remotely ex pI oiled by this
worm. Once such a node is identified. :In ensuing
exploitalion allempt will be observcd.
• Efploirariol/ Successful exploital ion relies on the dis-
covery of a particular vulnembility in (he viclim
node. It is often true thnL worms take advamage of
well-knowJI vulnerabiliLies and pllbJi.\·hed exploits to
compromise (heir vicLims.
• Replicmion A worm infeclion is nOl complcted [In-
til a replica is successfully transferred from the in-
fecter lo the vicLim. However.lhe boundary bel ween
this slage and the exploitation stage is often blurred:
some wonn could comnin a copy of itself :IS the pay-
load during the exploitalion: and others may have
an expliciL process downloading :l worm replica. A
completed replication converls the victim to a wonn
node. which is able to begin infecting others.
Based on the staged view of worm infection. lhere exist
initially two c1usses of nodes: infectious nodes and ml-
Ilemhle nodes. However. once a security patch is applied
to either a l'ulnemble node or an infeclious node. the node
will be turned imo <In illoculated node. Virulenl worms
allempt to more more nodes from vulnerable stalUS to in-
fectious staLUs. while wonn conlninment strategies strive
to either slow down such movement or inoculate more
nodcs from either vulnernb1c stale or infeclious s1:lte. Un-
fortunately, the exislence of worm olllbreaks sbows f:lster
worm infeclion rates lban inoculmioll rales.
However, if Ihe victim in Hgure I is able to fight back
the allempted infection, a significant difference can be
made. This paper explores such n "fight-b:1Ck" scbeme
and proposes n specinl "defensive" victim - the beehive.
A beebive can be thought of as an immunization service
guarding an unused bUl mUlable IP subspace. An unused
IP space hus the advanlages of caHecling and monitor-
ing highly concentrmed suspicious lraffic. and meanwhile
avoiding possible dislurbance to production nelworks.
The beehive has knowledge aboul currently knoll'lI \'ul-
IIembililies. Witb the IP space "allracting" the worms,
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fig. 2. [nlcracliollS Belween Bet'hivc amI Worms
ploit<ltion behavior associaLed with the known vulnerabili-
ties. The beehive will then identify the infecting node, and
defensively inject a m/llerabiliry-speeijic securiLy shot La
immunize the node. We note th<ll due to the associmcd
risks and responsibililies, a bcehive must be managed-by
<I trusted authorilY.
Figure 2 shows a typic<ll interaction beLween a beehive
and wonn insLances. Residing in a rOlllable and unused
network spacc. a beehive will detect various worm infec-
tion aLLempLs. For simpliciLy. Ihe figure only shows the
beehive and four vulnerable nodes.
I) Al first. node B. Ihe only infecLious node, will
spawn several threads La simultaneously probe and
infect other nodes: A, C, D. and the beehive (more
specifically. an IP belonging 10 the beehive).
2) Since nodes A, C. and D <Ire vulnerable, Ihe infec-
tion allemp!S resul! in successful replication of Ihe
worm from B La A. C, und D. The nodes A. C, and
D will Ihen be inslructed 10 <lctivate Lhe worm and
thus becomc infectious nodes anempLing to pass the
worm La mhers. However, when node B is infecting
the beehive, Lhe latter is able to discem such infec-
tion anempt and 11 security shot is injec!cd to immu-
nize B.
3) Nodes A, C, and D, which are now infectious. will
also aClivcly seek to infect other nodes. If the bee-
hive's IP address space is reasonably large. it m<lY
receive somc or the infeclion allempLs. Ir anllcked.
beehive will Ilght-b<lck by injecLing sccurity shots
to the infectors.
4) Suppose the security shots are nble to successfully
immunize Lhe infecting nodes. some (ir not <III) pre-
viously vulnerable nodes will become inocul:lted
and thus the worm propagation will be miLigclleu or
even slopped.
The scheme of beehive are based on Ihe following two
assumptions:
• The /l"IIsled awllOri/y /1U1//aging beehh'e shollld he
allowed /0 il/jee/ .l"ecllri/y sho/s /0 Ihose lI'orm-
inJeered /lodes rlwr lire actively illjee/ill8 olhers.
This assumption is justifiable from the following ob-
servmions: (I) Wonns inlecting nodes noL only cause
uisturbance in Ihe inrecteu nodes. bUI also generate
lots of lraffic afrecting other normal nodes <lnu the
whole InterneL. The V<!st detrimental impacts. includ-
ing networked service disruption and business slow-
down. demand an immediate sLoppage of infecting
nodes. (2) The defensive-only security shot, whieh
is .I'iglled and udministrated by a tru ..acd authority. is
a !echnically h<lrmless responsc with the benign in-
tenLion or immunizing infected nodes [29].
Although this Clssumptioll may nOl be universally nc-
,
Ill. EVALUATION OF BEEHIVE
A. Clas.~ic Epidemic Model
Suppose the infecLion rate of a certain worm is a con-
stant n. the classic epidemic worm propagmion model
r33j with a flnile population is defined by ;
In the following section. we eV:lluate the effectiveness
of the beehive approach and anempt to answer the follow-
ing questions: How elTective can a beehive be? What is
the reasonable size of Ihe associated IP space?
( I)
>'(t)
di(t) = a x -. x i(t) x dt
J\i
need a more powerful technique. Security patches
are able 10 seal vulnerability holes independent of
worm signatures. but it may inlroduce service dis-
mption. Nelwork filters can minimize such distur-
bance by examining incoming and omgoing lramc
and drop traffic that exploits vulnerabilities. How-
evcr. regular filters either coarsely block certain porI
number or require known worm signatures. Fortu-
nately. in:l recent worm-blocking project .l"hield [29J,
a vulnerability-driven network filter is developed for
the prevention or known vulnerability exploits with-
OUI knowing worm signatures. By applying their fil-
tering technique. beehive security shots can be de-
veloped once a vulnerability is idcntified. before ex-
ploiting worms come into being.
This paper uses i(l). v(f). and r(t) to represent the
number of infectious nodes. the number of vulnerable
nodes. and the number of inoculated nodes at time f.. re-
spectively. Also we denote Ihe total number of nodes in-
volved in a worm outbreak as N (N = i(t) + v(l.) +T(t)).
The not:lIions used throughout this paper are collected in
table I.
where v(t) = ,V i(t). (\' x 'Xl x 111, represents the
number of new worm nodes contributed by a single worm
source within cIl, period and di(t) is the number of new
worm nodes during the time period [L.I, + (Uj with current
worm population i(t).
In this section. we first introduce the notations uscd
in our analysis :md describe Ihe classic worm epidemic
model. We thcn (lerive a beehive modcl :md present its
analYlical and numeric:ll solutions. Simulation results
are also presented to confirm beehivc's effectiveness. Fi-
nally. we amdyze beehive under a more realistic IWo-
factor worm model.
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rig. 3. RcmOlcly Clenllillg n MSBta~lcr-lllreelcd Node
ceptable in the Internet. il will become more realis-
tic and acceptable, when differenl administflltion do-
m:lins. like ISPs, deploy their own beehives (0 pro-
tecl their imernal hosts ,md cooperate wilh each other
in tracking down worms propagaling across different
domains. If a beehive delects a wonll infeclion from
its own internal domain. it can directly inject the se-
curity shoL to immunize the node: if the infection is
from another domain, Ihe bcchive could collect the
el'idel1ce of the infection, and send a si.~/Ied copy of
this evidence to the bcchive responsible for thc other
domain. The laller beehive could then lake appro-
priate aClions based on the evidence. /\lso within a
large ISP network, a hierarchy of beehives may be
deployed. each being authoritalive over its own sub-
network.
• It is recllllically fea.\·ible 10 inject a securily .\·!Jor to
{I Il'orm-infecled /lode {lml rhe shot is able 10 pm-
ferr the lIode from bolh iI/coming alld OII11-:oillg ex-
ploitatiol/. Considering current network security re·
ality and the way worms infecl hosts using remotely
exploitable vulnerabilities. we argue thai a security
shot clIn be injected in a way similar to wonn infec-
tions I. Here we cite one real-world example justi-
fying this :lssumption: during the MSBlaster worm
outbreak in August. 2003. Oudot Laurent. a security
expert, wrote a seripL [301 (Figure 3) which is nble to
remotely clean a MSBl:lster-infected node. Once an
infectious node is identified, Ihe scripl is able to kill
the MSBlaster process in that node and also remove
:lffected registry entries.
However-the script itself in Figure 3 docs not prevent
the node from being affected again and lhus it is slill
not enough for beehive purpose. More import:llllly,
it requires Ihe worm's signature. To further immu-
nize the node withoUl specific worm signatures. we
1In some e:o;lremc c~scs. wonns could download securily pmeh~s 10
prevenl vulnerubitilies rrom being c.,ploited. til the~e e~~es. beehive is
nOl able 10 remotely inoculJle inrCelCd nodes ;md lleed other mecha-
nisms 10 block or filler trJflic from infcclcil nodes.
5
TABLE I
NOTATION USU) IN THE PAl'lOR
Dew-rip/io/l.
v(t) the number of vulnerable machines at Lime i during the spread of worm
i(l ) the number of infectious ITInchines at Lime i during the spread of worm
,'(1 ) the number of machines which were infected bm later inoculated before time t
N Ihe lOla I number of machines involved in a specific worm outbreak: N-v(L)+i(L)+r(t)
a/a(t) the infeclion nile of a (sclf-replicaling) worm at time I-
Bo the size of IP address space associated with a beehive, the average number of machines SC<JIlIlCU by an infected machine per unit lime
I 5"'''&01 I
vcncd into infeclious nodes during If., I, I-r/t.] iso(t) xv(t).
In other words,
The minus sign shows Ihe decreasing number ofvulner-
able nodes and thus the increasing number of infectious
nodes due 10 current in rcclion nUempts.
Similarly. when a beehive guarding an unused IP ad-
dress space of flo is deployed, the probability of a worm
source hilling Ihis IP space during time period It, t -I- dtl
is /3 - 1 - (1 - -¥& )sdt :::::: C l dl, where the conslant
C j C7" * ::-:: BoCa. Therefore, the number of infec-
tious machines that are inoculated during the lime period






Fig. 4. Example Worm Propagalion wilh Difrerent Infection Rale~:
U.6. 0.9, and 1.2
Eq (I) is also known as the logi.wic eqllariol1 [361 and
has the following solution:
dv(t) = -Cni(t)nU)rlt. (3)
N
i(t) = N - ~j-+--'r_Cl.c(~'~"I~ol (2) (4)
where T is some constant depcndent on the initial worm
population. Based on eq (2). example worm propagations
with three differenl infection rates are drawn in figure 4.
The curves are known as the logis!ic curves [361 and ex-
hibit the "sigmoid'· shape.
By A = I.'(f) t i(t) -1- I"(t). eC] (4) can be rewrillen as:
Summing eq (3) and eq (5), we achieve beehive model
based on the classic epidemic worm propag:ltion:
C. NUlI/edclIl alld AnalYTicaf Resufrs
where io is the initial infected nodes or "hit-Jis'" [15J size,
and 1.'0 is the inilial number of vulnerable nodes.
JThe numher / IGis {hc nel\\'ork mnsk lcnglh. which corresponds 10
a c1~ss B nelwork wilh nelmask 255,255.0.0. Similarly. the nlllllher
/12 corresponds 10 ~ nc!wnrk wilh nClnmsk 255.240.0.0.
Numerical solutions of eC] (6) are presented in rigure 5
with varying beehive network (i.e. size of associated IP
address space) rrom /16to /12 J, where the inilial values
(6):, [;.] [-~' ~~;i][ ,. ]
i(O) = in, v(O) = L'O
B. BeehiFe Under Classic t.pillemic Mode!
~Thc ~ppm:'(im~lion is ~chicvcd by 'I:lylor expansion basel.! on lhe
r~Cllha!lii(l)rit is much smaller lh~1I 2J2.
Let s be the average scanning rate of one worm source
probing for victims, !hen during the lime period It, t+dI.J,
the number of scan attempts from one worm source is
,<; x ril, and there are s x dt x i(t) scans in Imal for all
i(t) wonn sources. Assuming the scans are uniformly dis-
tribuled over all IPv4 address space (2:~2), the probabililY
ofa mnehine being sc:mned is a.(t) = 1-(1-~ ri(l)dl ~
Coi(l)tlt 2, where the constanl Co = 21:.
With Ihe tOlal number of currenl scan auempls, the ex-
pected number of vulnerable machines thaI will be sub-
__.. ,~:o.,..::~.~:::.:::.:::::::.:~:;-J
""'" ,«<0 ,,=.~,_.-. .....,
, . ,~"""~_.,,
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(al Numhn of Inreeliolls Nodes (b) Numher of (Remnining) Vulnerahle
NOlks
(e) Number ur Inocula[ed Nodes
Fig. 5. The Effecliveness uf Beehivc Bascd on Classic Epidemic Wurm i\'lmkl
and <lverage scanning mte are:
The v<llue of lOIi is a reasonable estimate fur initially vul-
nerable nodes. For example. il is eslim<lled thallhe num-
ber of nodes vulnerable 10 MSDl:lster is 3GO, 000 [8]. The
X-axis is in infectio/l time 1II1;IS; each time unit is the du-
ration of one successrul worm infection session (usually
several seconds Lo Lens of seconds). The cases of differellt
beehives are compared wiLh the c1:lssic epidemic model
with no beehive ("Bechive Network 0" case in Figure 5)
:md random scanning strategy is :lssumed. Figure 5(01).
5(b), and 5(c) show the number of infeclious nodes. vul-
nemble nodes. and inoculaled nodes (immunized by bee-
hive), respectively. 1L is obvious that bOlh the worm cover-
age and intensity havc been funher mitigaled with larger
beehive network. A /13 beehive neLwork is <lble LO ef-
fectively mitigate Lhc worm propagation by reducing the
maximum number of infection nodes lo as low as 1;Jl){ of
potential maximum vulnef<lble nodes. while a /12 neLwork
is able to 101a11y prevent the \\"orm oULbreak. Speciully.
Figure 5 exposes two interesting results:
• Figure 5('1) shows lhat after lhe IOOOOth Lime unit.
Lhe worm outbreak under a smaller bechive network
(/14) has fewer infectious nodcs (aclive worm in-
sLanees) Ihan the worm OlILllreak under u larger bee-
hive network (j13).
• Figure 5(c) shows thal a sm<lller beehive nelwork
(/1'1) inoculates more worm insl:mces lh:l1l a lmger
beehive network (/1:3).
These seemingly unexpected resulls can be explained
:IS follows: Based on Figure 5(b). during the time pe-
riod when (he first rcsulL :lbo\'e comes up, there exisl a
larger number of remaining vulnerable nodes (which arc
IlI1fOliChed during (he oULbreuk) in the larger beehive case
lh:ll1 in (he smaller beehive case. The reason for this is tlwt
lhe ombreak is pUL under coli/raJ fasler hy a larger beehive
network and thus fewer nodes are infected. The second re-
sul! above can be explained using the same argument: A
larger beehive is able to contain Lhe wonn outbreak earlier
- more speci ficully - during ils sloll' .HQrt phase [19J.
The effecLiveness of Ileehive can be beller character-
ized by the aCl/lel/ess (1\.) and maximulII cOl'emge (II» of
a worm oUlbreak. The aCUleness of an olHbreak is defined
as the first-order differentiation of i(t). i.e.. A = d~,t),
while the maximum worm coverage (1l) can be modeled
as lJlax{ ig.l : /. ~ OJ.





Fig. 6. The AcU!cncss or Wonn OllllJrc;lk
Figure 6 shows the acuLeness of worm outbreaks us-
ing different beehive neLworks. WiLh a larger IP :lddress
space, beehive will be more capable of slowing down
worm propagation. Figure 7 shows the effectivcness of
beehive in reducing Lhe ma,ximum worm coverage. The
l:lrger the associ OiLed IP space, the more powerfullhc bee-







u(Cnv - C z ill V - COOl)
where C 2 = N - Eo hI '{'o,
According to Theorem I. i(t) re:lches iLs maximum
value at 11 -----: Bo, If we dc!ine the corresponding time
point as I' and integrate the len-hand side or eq (8) from
v(O) = 1,'0 to Do. the result is the same as integrating the
right-hand side from 0 La I':
Fig. 7. The J\'laximulll Wonn COI'crage
Imegrating on bOlh sides, we have:




To verify our numerical and anulytieal results. we have
developed a beehive simulator based on a uniroml-scan
worm simulator developed by Zou HOI to confirm the ef-
fectiveness of beehive.
In the simulaLion. the propagation of uniform-scan
worms is modeled in discrete time and the simulaled sys-
tcm consists of N (N ----' lOG) hasLs that e:m reach each
other direcLly. A host could sLay in one of three sLates :11
:my time: infecriolls, VI/II/crable. or illoclIlated. However.
:l host is in the illocl/latcd slale only when it is attempt-
ing to infect beehive :md is thus immunized. The oLher










itt) + l'(t) = io I
To compleLe our anulysis, we further obtain the analyL-
ical form or maximum worm coverage II> and the corre-
sponding Lime instance,
We add up the Lwo equal ions in (6) and derive the fol-
lowing equmion:
Thus.
Whenlhe wonn propag:lIion re.,c1J(~s its maximum cov-
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"(I)itt) = N - '11(1.) 1- Do 1n-
Vo
Hence
Fig. S. Simul~lion: Number of InrCClinus Nodes
Finally. we obtain
iI> = i(t) = 1 _ Do + Eo In Bo
N N N l,'n
71u!orem I: Assume that (i(l.), v(t)) is the unique so-
lution of eq (6). then i reaches its rna:.;imum value ii' x N
ifand only if v(t) = B o. where II> = 1 - ~~ + ~ III*
If we further sulJSlilUte i(t) in eq (7) to eq (3), we ob-
Lain
We run Ihe simulation 100 limes in a Dell PowerEdge
server with a 2,6GHz Intel Xeon processor and 2GB
RAM. Figure 8 shows the average number of infectious
nodes with varying beehive network from /16 to /12.
The time unit of X-axis is mil1l1/c. which is used in Ihis
discrele-lime-based simulator and thus is different from
lhe infection time uniL uscd in the numerical results. The
simulaLion results malch well with the numerical resulls
in Figure 5(<1), We furlher calculate two envelop curves
for these 100 runs based on the maximum <lnd minimum
8
values for the numbcr of infectious hosts al each time I
and find thaL the maximum difference beLween these two
curves is only OAo/c, to the population size N (l06).
E. Beeltil'e Under "Ji1'()-FaCfOr Worm Modef
The e1assic epidcmic model is simple and does nOL con·
sider other f<lctors like network congestions and human
counter-measures whieh could also affcet the worm prop-
agation. The t\l'o-faclor worm modeL shown in eq (9). is
proposed 10 capture these factors and exhibi!s more real-
istic results. This subsection applies beehive to the fWO-
faclOr modcl. However. beehivc can be generally applied
to any other worm models such as the AAWP model £25].
< •
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di(t.)
dI ~ 0(1) x IN - ",(1) ;(1) -q,(t)] x ;(1.) dr,(!)
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Fig, 9. Simulatiun: Load or Bcchi\'c
Figure 9 shows the number of security shOls injected
per mil/life during the wonn propagation. which is imer-
eSling for understanding the possible load on beehive. The
maximum number is 8200 per minute or 1:37 per second
in the case of a /1-1 beehive network. Interestingly, the
beehive workload is 110/ in a linear relation with the bee-
hive IP space size. In the Figure. the ranking of beehive
peak load is /12 < /16 < /1;~ < /15 < /14. The reason
is similar to Ihal for the results in SecLion II1-C: A beehive
with a larger IP space leads 10 a higher worm Iti/ rale and
therefore quenches the worm outbreak earlier. resuhing in
lower worm immunizution workload.
Additionully, we examine the impOlct of immunization
time (i.e .. the time to immunize one node) on the dlcc·
tiveness of beehive. Figure 10 shows worm propagation
under a /14 beehive network wiLh varying immunization
Lime. As expected, longer immunization lime makes bee-
hive less efficient in suppressing worm propagation. bUI
the impact is not significant.
,,"~
In the fll'o}aclOrworm model equation, q=(t) and 1'=(1.)
accommodate the effect of human counLer-measures dur-
ing worm propagation: q,,(l) represents the number of
nodes converLed from the l'lIfnerable slOlte to Ihe inocu-
lated state, while the r=(t) is the number of nodes con-
verted from Ihe il/fec/iou.I· staLe to the illm:lI/med state.
The infec!ion rme a(l). which is now a variable instead
of a constant. considers the impact of network conges-
tions caused by worm propagation itself. Other notations
:lre cOllsislent with those in table I. This Iwo-facTOr worm
model enhances the e1assie epidemic model particul:lrly
during the l:lsL S1:lge 01" worm propagation, i.e., the sfow
fini.l"h stage [19].





where constanLs It' :md 1/ are used to adjust the rate of con-
verting nodes into inoculaLed state. and the consU:mt 11 is
lIsed to adjust the infecLion rate so thOlt it will be sensi-
tive to !he number of infectious hosls. When Il.' = O. 'U =
O.1l = O. the t\Vo f:lctors worm model falls back LO the
classic model.
Finally. we derive bcehive model based on eq (9):





n(lW', - ,'(I.) - i(l)I;(I)dl. - drA!)
-C1i(l.)lU
-o(l.)"(I.)i(t)d(l) - dq,(I)
C1i(I}/t. -I- dr=(t) + dq,,(t.)






The term C1 i(t)dl capLures the worm·immunization ef-
fect of beehive: :md the r(L) here combines beehive and hu-












, . ...""r~'_ "I
I : g:;:::::::=: '::
,. L.....,'~'~,"













~ _..AL.. ~,.,: :':.:.::'::~:::::::: :::::~
o =0 ,= ,=
(n) Nlllllbcrof Infectious Nodes (b) Number uf (Remaining) Vulnerahle
Nmlcs
(e) Number of Inoculmed Nudes
Fig. II. The Elre-cll"cness of Beehive Based on TIm· Far/Of Worm Model
more gener:.!! than the nUI:llion of r(l) in Table I.
With the following paral11c!crs: II - 3. IV - , .5c -
ri.1/ = 210-12, i(O) = io = 10. dO) - {,'O - lOG. Ii = 10.
we derive numerical solutions in Figures I I. The <lcutc-
ness of worm ouLl>reak is shown in Figure 12. These re-
sulLs confiml the generality and clTcctivcncss of beehive
approach.
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IV, DISCUSSIONS
Unused IP space The previous section has shown the
effecliveness or beehive in suppressing worm propaga-
lioll. From Ihe beehive models. Ihe effectiveness largely
depends on the prohabilily of worm instances hilling the
bechive. Assuming random-prubing strmegy during worm
propagalion. II high prob:lbility of hilling the beehive re-
quires a large unused IP :ludress space. Fortllnmely. bee-
hive's IP space size requirement (e.g.. a /13 network)
seems reasonable and affordable. For example, CAIDA
LIJhas used a /8 network at UCSD :md two / Hi networks
a! Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL) 10 collect real
data measuring the spread or the Code Red v2 worm. Four
class B networks (a /1-'1 network) h:lve also been used as
Inlemet sinks L24J for network :lbuse monitoring.
Avoiding beehive The fight-hack nature or beehive
mOlY disclose its associated IP space. IL is possible for
a worm developer to sequentially or selectively pre-scan
the Imernet space for hims !O locate beehive IP addresses.
Once the fight-back activity is detected, the worm devel-
oper could presumahly identify beehive and hard-code the
corresponding network space into woon code so thm it
can avoid beeh ive.
There are several solutions: one way is to propose a
roaming heehive whose nelwork space is nOi fixed. How-
ever. this roaming approach may require more IP address
space for beehive purpose. A more interesting and effec-
tive approach is to create a beehive with sC{l/lerell rather
than continuous IP addresses, which will be helpful in
fighting smart topology-aware worms: each network do-
main "dol1afes" unused IP addresses and re-direcis traffic
towards these addresses to a few beehive sites. Several
recent works. including Collapsar ll7J and honeyd l18j.
have developed techniques for the re-direclion or traffic
towards non-existent hosts in different domains to a ccn-
tralized facility, run by a trusted authority. Furthermore.
with the emergence of .I·ink hole networks [3 [], traffic re-
direction overhead will be significantly reduced. All these
techniques will make a beehive with scattered IP spllce
feasible.
Fooling heehive Spoofing is a potential way 10 at-
tack beehive: one worm could initiate an infection with
spoofed source :lddress. When sllch infection is detected
by beehive. the ignorant beehive may inject a security shot
to the spoofed node. Such abusing attempts necd to be de-
tected and avoided, ;llthough the shot is not cxpected 10
do any haoo to the spoofed node. Several schemes h:lve
been proposed to uetect and prevent such spooling attacks,
like router-assisted source address checking and various
authenticated methods to ensure the identity of communi-
cating peers. However, extensive study on the problem is
heyond the scope of this paper.
Proaclive beehive The beehive presenteu in this paper
is reactive. However. a pJVacrive beehive C<ln :llso be de-
veloped. when a vulnerability is identillcu and the exploit-
ing wonns have 1101 yet emerged. Such pmGeth'e beehive
can be safely deployed in each network domain, and it
will actively probe and detect machines with this vulnera-
bility withill its own dom<lin. Once a vulnerahle machine
is found, a security shot ean be injected 10 prevent it from
being exploited in the future. In this case, the first assump-
lion in Section II will liar be necessary.
V. A I3EEIlIvE PROTOTYPE
In this seclion. we present a sigmllure-b:lsed prototype
to demonstrate the feasibility of beehive nppronch.
Figure 13 shows a generic components of a beehive:
:1 sellsor component and :l sllOl illjectrJT component. The
sensor component would either passively wait for worm
probings or actively monitor real-time traffic to identify
vulnerability-specific exploitations. Once an exploit is
identified. the g1caneu informations such as the IP :lddress
of the worm source :lnd the vulnerabilities exploited by
the worm will be given to the shot injector, which then in-
jects an associmed shot to the worm source. In the follow-
ing example, we describe one beehive prototype against
the Linux Adore worm [91. The system is implemented
llsing RedHm 7.0 Linux operating systems.
Pig. 13. Generic Componems or n Beehive
The Linux Adore worm :lllempts to propagate itself via
exploiting different un-patched services in the default in-
stallation ofLinux Red Hat 6.2 :md 7.0 operating systems:
rpc.slard [21. lI'lIflpd[4J. BIND[31. and LPRng l5J. If there
is :1 node running any listed vulnerable service and it is
sllccessfully probed, the Adore worm will try to exploit it
10
and execute the shell commanus (shown in Figure 14) au-
tomatically rcgmdless of which vulnemble service is ex-
ploited.
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Fig. 1-1. Shell Commamls Propagming The Linux Allure Worm
In the current prototype, beehive 1cvcmges an open-
source IDS sys!Cm, i.e.. S/lort [34J. as the sensor compo-
nenl. The particular rules detecting incoming Adore worm
infection attempts are lisled in Figure 15:
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Fig. 15. Snort Rule Sels For D~lel:ling The InkcliOl1 or Allore WOnTlS
Once the Adore sensor reports the exploitation attempt.
il notifies the shot injector component with the IP address
of intruding node. The injector will exploit the same vul-
nerabilities used by the Adore worm and inject adore-
bee.o. a load:lble kernel module containing a set or adore
wooo signatures. The signatures are s!lOwn in Figurc 16.
Though the same signatures are used, lldore-bee.o mod-
ule is able to drop both incoming :lnd outgoing exploitll-
tion tmffic matching the signatures. while the rule sets in
Figure 15 are only used to uctect incoming allemplS.
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Fig. 16. SignJlures in adore·bee.o Mollule
Once planted, the ndore-bee.o module will be inserted
into the kernel and scrutinize every incoming and outgo-
ing packets for potential vulnerability-exploiting tmffic.
Once a packet matches a signature in the signature set. the
packet is marked as worm-related traffic and thus dropped.
The performance overhead is marginal [16] since there are
only one or two signatures related to a worm in general.
The reason why the Linux Adore worm requires five sig-
natures is that il is a multi-vector worm and has the ability
to propagate itself through various channels.
Due Lo the associ:lled risks and lack of a scale worm
testbed. the system hilS just been deploycd in a spccific:llly
configured local network with two nodes. However, iL has
shown hOlh practicality and effecLiveness by successfully
injecting a security shm from one node running beehive 10
immunize :mother node running the Linux Adore worm.
To fully validate beehive, a scale worm testbed with tens
of thousands of nodes is needed. The DETER f381 projecL
is proposed to address this need, and beehive experimems
can be performed on lOp of it once it is available. In the
meantime, we plan to cxtend our beehive prototypc to :Jd-
dress the following issues:
Hetero~eneily Different sysLem platforms and differ-
em operming systems impose different requiremenLs in
designing and implementing security shots. Though rc-
cem aCLive worms will usu:llly propagate on one particu-
lar platform or one type of operating system, there are cer-
Lain worms which are able to propagate on multiple plat-
forms. Developing techniques to cope with helerogeneity
is a challcnging problem.
Signature independence We note thm the need for
worm signaLures in our current beehive prototype is
only for implemenlation convenience. The signaLure-
independent technique proposed in shiehl [291 will be ap-
plied Lo bcchive security shot concoction. As soon as a
vulnerability is identified, a shield-style security shot will
be installed in the bechive to fight back any exploiting
worm in the future.
VI. RELATED WORK
Proac/;l'e or IIltlllllally reaclil'e approaches are among
Lhe most common pracLices in preventing or mitigating
spreauing of worms. As shown in section I, although
proac/i1'e approaches like Windows Update Service are
effective. it has shown reluctance in acceptance due to the
concern of unreliability and potential service disruption.
Also, any manual counter-mC:lsures will be invalidated by
virulent spreading of worms.
From section II, effective worm containment mecha-
nisms should be :lble to either decrease the lIow from the
l'lIll/erahie state to the in!ec/ioll.\· slate. termed as flow IN.
or increase the flow from the i/lfecrious node to the i/lOCIl-
lared S!:lte, represenLed as now OUT. or the combination.
The now from the I'Illl/ert/hle state 10 the illoclIlared state
is able to decrease the number of vulnerable nodes and
thus indirectly reduce the flow I tV. We classify related
work based on their impacL on these Lwo flows:
DccreflSing the flow INMost of current counter-
measures fall in this category. Moore e/ al. [22] explores
"
the effect ofdynamic <Iuarantine in confining worm propa-
gation. In particulur. two defense stralegies urc examined:
blackli.l'tillg known infec/ed J/ode.l· and fillering cOI/Ilec-
lionl' ex!Ji/}iring 1I'0rll/ SigIlOflIl"C.\-. HOlVever. they require
Lhe exisLence of an efficient evenl notificaLion system for
Lhe awareness of detected infecled nodes :llld worm sig-
nawres. Williamson e/ al. [14J suggests modifying Lhe
network stuck so lhm the spreading rate of worms could
be slowed down. Such an approach requires the modi-
ficalion of commodiLy opcrating systems to be crfecLive.
Chen e/ al. [23J proposes two rate-limiting algorithms. ei-
ther temporal or spa/inl. to mitig<lte the wonn prop:lgalion
at the ISP level. The algorithms are based on the behav-
ioral difference bctween normal hosts and worm-infected
hosts. P:Jrticularly. a wonn-infecLcd host has a much
higher connection-failure rate when it scans lhe InLcmct
with randomly selected addresses. bBrea [35J is <I tool
Lhilt is able to creale virtual presences on behalf of those
unused IP addresses on a nelwork. The virtual presences
is able 10 reply the probing attempts in such a W<lY that
makes the wonn inst<lnces "stuck". Beehive appro<lch is
different from, and complement. these approaches. since
it can reduce the number of infectious nodes by ac/il'ely
immunizing them.
Increasing the flow OUT This eaLegory requires effi-
cient worm idemijicario/l and i.wla/iOll/imlllllnizario/l. Re-
cent work [28][221 mostly focuses on the issues of worm
idcntific:ltion 'Inc!. isolaLion. and has not addressed the im-
muniz<ltion.
Darknet 4 is anolher interesting research Lopic. Moni-
toring and characterizing background /raffie for darknets
have shown promise in understanding network abuse [311
[241, sensing IntcmeL motions r37l. and inferring eert:lin
remote network events [26). There exisLs lillie or no le-
gitimale traffic in the darknet and any anom:lly will not
be obscured by voluminous producLion Lraffie. Additional
{(clive responders C<ln be further deployed to discriminate
between different types of activities, including intrusion
or attack attempts. However, they have nOL :lddressed how
to contain or suppress worms using Lhese darknets. In an-
other interesting direction. IlOlleypo/ [391 h:lS been pro-
posed as an effective way to capture worms in the wild.
Furthermore, honeypot has also been leveraged for early
worm detection [191, global worm detenLion f17], or au-
tomatic worm signature extraction [321. The concepl of
ellil hOl/eypor [30], which parallels beehive effort, is pro-
posed to poison or bile back aggressive worms. However.
no form:ll model and analysis h:lve been seen so far.
_I A uJrknet is J ponioll of routable IP spJce in which no JClivc ser·
I'ices or servers reside,
VII. CONCl.USION
Destructive spreading of worms exposes the fragility of
current Internet infrastructure .md invalidates any manu,,1
counter-measures. This paper proposes beehive to SllP-
press worm propagmion by directly righting back and im-
munizing worm-infecting hosts. Beehive leverages the
unused and routable IP space for wonn infection cap-
ture: nnd beehive security shots arc capable of shielding
known vulnerabilities. The effectiveness of beehive has
been evaluated and demonstrated with analysis and simu-
]ation results. rurthcrmure. " beehive prototype has been
developed to demonstrate its feasibility.
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